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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

18 October 1951

SUBJECT: SE-17: THE CURRENT OUTLOOK IN PAKISTAN
(Draft for IAC Representatives)

The Assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan

1. On 16 October Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated by a man now officially described as an Afghan national. The Premiership has been assumed by the Governor-General of Pakistan, Khwaja Nazimuddin.

Effect on the Stability of the Regime

2. There is unlikely to be any immediate threat to the stability of the regime. The popular reaction to the murder has been one of shock and revulsion. The group of Moslem League leaders which Liaquat headed occupies a dominant position in Pakistani politics, has maintained a strong grip on the army and on the press and radio, and appears to be dealing efficiently with the situation. Although there is some danger of disorders in the traditionally turbulent

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tribal areas in the North West Frontier Province from which the assassin came, the government will probably be able to contain them. Opposition groups are weak. The army conspiracy of last spring appears to have been effectively crushed.

3. Nevertheless, the government is likely to be less firm and less powerful than it was under Liaquat. Nazimuddin is a relatively colorless though capable East Pakistan politician who appears to have been chosen as a symbol of national unity and as a neutral chairman; neither he nor any of his colleagues appear to possess Liaquat's high degree of personal vigor and political prestige. The absence of an established line of succession encourages rivalry within the ruling group. Finally, despite the initial popular reaction, the use of violence as a political weapon may serve to encourage extremists.

Effect on the Kashmir Dispute*

4. The assassination does not affect our present estimate that neither Pakistan nor India is likely deliberately to initiate hostilities over Kashmir prior to the end of 1951.

* See NIE-41, "Probable Developments in the Kashmir Dispute to the End of 1951," published 14 September 1951.

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The leaders of both countries appear genuinely shocked by the assassination and anxious to avoid trouble, and are probably capable of preventing public pressure from getting out of hand.

5. However, the assassination will probably oblige Pakistan's leaders to review Liaquat's Kashmir policy. The meeting of the pro-Indian Kashmir Constituent Assembly, scheduled for 31 October, and the submission of the Graham report to the UN Security Council make further decisions inescapable. It may well be that the new government will feel impelled to prosecute Pakistan's claims even more vigorously. In the absence of any conciliatory act by India, the Pakistan Government would almost certainly increase its pressure for firm UN action either in the Security Council or through submission of the issue to the General Assembly. If these tactics failed to produce results, the chances would increase substantially that Pakistan would deliberately resort to war to be forced into war by army and popular pressure.

6. There is a possibility that extremist elements in Azad (pro-Pakistan) Kashmir may attempt in the near future to take advantage of the situation and, by attacking Indian troops, to bring about a general resumption of hostilities in Kashmir. There is also a slight chance that hotheaded Pakistani army

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officers not arrested in connection with last spring's conspiracy might take similar action.

Effect on Relations with Afghanistan

7. The official description of the assassin as an Afghan national may create some public pressure for war against Afghanistan. Pakistan may demand that Afghanistan make some atonement for the assassination and renounce further agitation in regard to Pushtoonistan. Even if Afghanistan proves unresponsive, however, it is doubtful that the Pakistan Government would wish to go to war or that public opinion could force the government to go to war.

Effect on Relations with the West

8. Liaquat's colleagues, notably Foreign Minister Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan and the new Governor-General, have shared his pro-Western leanings. But the unsettled state of the Kashmir dispute, plus increasing anti-Westernism in the Moslem world, particularly as a result of the Anglo-Egyptian crisis, will make it more difficult for Liaquat Ali's successors to maintain a pro-Western orientation. Although it is highly unlikely that the Government of Pakistan would turn toward the Soviet bloc, neutralism will almost certainly increase.

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